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RECENT DECISIONS
by the present holding. It may at least be said that the decision
represents an indirect revitalization of the Corrupt Practices Act
philosophy of restricting union rights in the use of their funds
for political campaigning, perhaps made necessary by the some-
what sterilizing effect on the act of the CIO holding. Now, a
union member under a Railway Labor Act union-shop agreement
has the right that his dues not be relegated to support a political
activity to which he is opposed, regardless of whether or not the
Corrupt Practices Act prohibits that activity.
Although the reasoning advanced by the majority does not
directly face the fundamental issue of to what extent the individual's
first amendment guarantees are a bondslave to the union's need
of financial support for collective bargaining, the Court has none-
theless evidenced a concern, albeit indirectly, lest political freedom
be made overly subservient to general group welfare under the
guise of sharing the cost burden.
M
TAXATION - SCOPE OF THE MEDicAL DEDUCTION.-- A tax-
payer, who was suffering from a heart disease, was advised to take
a trip to Florida for the winter months by his physician. The
taxpayer claimed the hotel lodging expenses for himself and his
wife and child as "medical deductions." The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit upheld this claim. On the other hand, a
taxpayer in the Second Circuit, who had been advised by his
physician to take a trip to Bermuda, following major abdominal
surgery, had his claim for deduction of lodgings for himself and
his wife denied by the Court of Appeals. Both circuits, however,
agreed that the costs of the transportation to Florida and Bermuda
were allowable "medical deductions." Commissioner v. Bilder, 289
F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. granted, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 3154
(U.S. Nov. 13, 1961) (No. 384); Carasso v. Commissioner,
292 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1961).
Both the 1939 and the 1954 Internal Revenue Codes made
provisions for the allowances of "medical expenses" as deductions
from gross income.1  Section 24(a) (1) of the 1939 Internal
SInt. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(x), added by ch. 619, § 127, 56 Stat. 825
(1942), as amended, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 24(a) (1), 53 Stat.
16 (1939), as amended, ch. 619, § 127, 56 Stat. 826 (1942) [hereinafter cited
as 1939 Code]. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 213 [hereinafter cited as 1954
CODE].
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Revenue Code [hereinafter cited as 1939 Code] 2 provided that there
would be no allowable deductions for personal, living, or family
expenses unless those expenses were incurred as extraordinary
medical expenses in which case they were deductible under section
23(x).' The 1939 Code section 23(x) defined "medical care"
as including "amounts paid for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation,
treatment or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting
any structure or function of the body. . . ., 4 In Commissioner v.
Stringham,5 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (in adopting
the tax court's opinion) permitted a taxpayer a deduction under
1939 Code section 2 3(x) for the expenses incurred for the trans-
portation, food and lodging of his daughter, who was in Arizona for
medical purposes. The court, however, disallowed as a deduction
that portion of the expenses attributed to the girl's tuition fees.
These expenses were regarded as strictly personal and therefore not
deductible. Thus, to qualify as a medical expense under 1939 Code
section 23(x), the cost had to be primarily incurred for the pre-
vention, treatment, or recovery of a health condition of the taxpayer
or his family.6 Expenses not meeting this test were considered
as personal expenses and, consequently, were held to be non-
deductible.
7
At the time the 1939 Code was revised in 1954, thd defini-
tion of "medical expenses" was discussed in detail in both the
House of Representatives reports 8 and the Senate Committee
2 For text of 1939 Code § 24(a) (1), see note 13 infra.
3For text of 1939 Code § 23(x), see note 13 infra.
41939 Code § 23(x).
5 183 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1950) (per curiam), affirming 12 T.C. 580 (1949).
6 Commissioner v. Stringham, 183 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1950) (per curiam),
affirming 12 T.C. 580 (1949); Estate of Embry v. Gray, 143 F. Supp. 603
(W.D. Ky. 1956), appeal dismissed per stindation, 244 F.2d 718 (6th Cir.
1957) (per curiam); Dobkin v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 886 (1950). In
Havey v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 409, 413 (1949), the court stated: "It
seems clear to us that the deduction in question may be claimed only where
there is a health or body condition coming within the statutory concept
and where the expense was incurred primarily for the prevention or allevia-
tion of such condition. An incidental benefit is not enough." See 5 MERiNs,
LAW OF FEDERAL INcOmE TAXATION §31A.08 n.50 (1956), wherein the
following qualification test was posed: "Was the taxpayer, in incurring the
expense, guided by a physician's bona fide advice that such a treatment was
necessary to the patient's recovery from, or prevention of a specific ailment?"
7 Commissioner v. Stringham, supra note 6, wherein the court disallowed
the taxpayer a deduction for the costs of his child's education while she was
in Arizona for the alleviation of a bronchial condition.
s H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 30, A60, 3 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 4017, 4197 (1954): "Subsection (e) defines medical care to
mean amounts paid for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or pre-
vention of diseases or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function
of the body (including amounts paid for accident or health insurance), or
for transportation primarily for and essential to medical care. The deduction
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reports. 9 These reports show that the intent of the lawmakers
in revising these two sections was to eliminate food and lodging
expenses of the taxpayer and his family as medical deductions. °
An example, cited in the House report and later adopted by the
Federal Tax Regulations,"" dearly indicated both the legislative
intent and the Commissioner's interpretation of the new sections:
[I] f a doctor prescribes that a patient must go to Florida in order to al-
leviate specific chronic ailments and to escape unfavorable climatic con-
ditions which have proven injurious to the health of the taxpayer, and
the travel is prescribed for reasons other than the general improvement
of a patient's health, the cost of the patient's transportation to Florida
would be deductible but not his living expenses while there.
12
To codify this intent Sections 262 and 213 of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code [hereinafter cited as 1954 Code] were passed. These
sections differed slightly from their 1939 counterparts." Section
permitted for 'transportation primarily for and essential to medical care'
clarifies existing law in that it specifically excludes deduction of any meals
and lodging while away from home receiving medical treatment" (See text
accompanying note 13 infra).
9 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 35, 219-20, 3 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 4621, 4666 (1954): "A new definition of medical expenses is
provided which allows the deduction of only transportation expenses for
travel prescribed for health, and not the ordinary living expenses incurred
during such a trip."
1OH. R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 8; S. Rep. No. 1622, supra note 9.
"'Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1 e) (1) (iv) (1957).
12 H. R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 8. Accord, Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1 (e)
(1) (iv) (1957). The Regulations also contain the following language which
is very similar to that used in the House Committee Report on this section:
"Expenses paid for transportation primarily for and essential to the rendition
of the medical care are e*penses paid for medical care. However, an
amount allowable as a deduction for 'transportation primarily for and es-
sential to medical care' shall not include the cost of any meals and lodging
while away from home receiving medical treatment"
'1 1939 Code 1954 CoDE
"§ 23 Deductions from gross in- "§ 213 Medical, dental, etc., expenses:
come. In computing net income there (a) Allowance of deduction.-There
shall be allowed as deductions: .... shall be allowed as a deduction the
following amounts of the expenses
(x) Medical, dental, etc., expenses. paid during the taxable year, not
Expenses paid during the taxable compensated for by insurance or
year, not compensated for by insur- otherwise, for medical care of the
ance or otherwise, for medical care taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent.
of the taxpayer, his spouse, or a ...
dependent. . . (e) Definitions-For purposes of
this section-
The term 'medical care,' as used in (1) The term 'medical care' means
this subsection, shall include amounts amounts paid-
paid for the diagnosis, cure, mitiga- (A) for the diagnosis, cure, miti-
tion, treatment, or prevention of dis- gation, treatment, or prevention of
ease, or for the purpose of affecting disease, or for the purpose of affect-
any structure or function of the body ing any structure or function of the
1961 ]
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262 states that there shall be no deduction for personal expenses
unless expressly provided elsewhere in the chapter.14  This section
makes no mention of "extraordinary medical expenses" as did its
1939 counterpart.1 5 Section 213(a) and (e) like its 1939 counter-
part provides for the deduction of expenses incurred in "medical
care," but unlike the 1939 section, 1954 Code section 213(e) in
its definition of "medical care" contains a specific enumeration
allowing for a deduction for "transportation costs." '" Other than
this specific enumeration, the 1939 and 1954 sections for the
most part read exactly alike.'7  It is this subparagraph, allowing a
deduction for "transportation costs," that has caused the difference
in interpretation in the two instant cases. The Third Circuit views
it as a specific deduction, while the Second Circuit considers it an
exclusive deduction. Therefore, the Third Circuit will permit
other deductions to qualify under 1954 Code section 213, while
the Second Circuit will recognize only a "transportation costs"
deduction.' s
The majority in Bilder, the Third Circuit case, rely strongly
on the fact that Congress in enacting 1954 Code section 213 used
the exact language of 1939 Code section 23(x). 1 The Court
felt that the legislature had knowledge of the liberal judicial inter-
pretation of 1939 Code section 23(x) and wished to perpetuate this
construction in the new section.20 The majority opinion indicates
that the Court considered subparagraph (B), concerning "trans-
portation costs," to be a specific deduction, rather than an
exclusive deduction, i. e., the legislature inserted this section so
(including amounts paid for accident body (including amounts paid for ac-
or health insurance)." cident or health insurance), or(B) for transportation primarilyfor and essential to medical care re-
"§ 24(a) General Rule. In comput- ferred to in subparagraph (A)."
ing net income no deduction shall in (Emphasis added.)
any case be allowed in respect of- "§262 Personal, living, and family(1) Personal, living, or family ex- expenses. Except as otherwise ex-
penses, except extraordinary medical pressly provided in this chapter, no
expenses deductible under section 23 deduction shall be allowed for per-
(x); .... " (Emphasis added.) sonal, living, or family expenses."
(Emphasis added.)
14 See note 13 vtupra.
'1 Ibid.
161954 CODE §2 13(e) (1) (B) : "for transportation primarily for and
essential to medical care referred to in subparagraph (A)."
17 See note 13 supra.
1s It is to be noted that the words "transportation costs" when used in
the tax area refer only to the fare incurred, e. g., train fare, plane fare, etc.
This is to be distinguished from "travel costs" which include "transportation




that there would be no mistaking the fact that "transportation'
expenses were deductible, and not for the purpose of making these
expenses the only deductible expenses. On the other hand,
Carasso, the Second Circuit case, and the dissent in Bilder argued
that subparagraph (B) was intended as more than a specific
deduction. These opinions stressed the need of reading 1954 Code
sections 262 and 213 conjunctively.21  If this were done they
felt that the legislative intent was clearly manifested. They pointed
out that 1954 Code section 262 permits deducting only those per-
sonal expenses expressly provided for,22 and that the only personal
expenses allowable as a "medical deduction" are the "transportation
costs" provided for in section 213 (e) (1) (B) . 23  Hence, "the
separate specific provision of section 213(e) (1) (B) allowing a
deduction of transportation expenses essential to medical care sug-
gests that the immediately preceding language of section 213(e)
(1) (A) is intended to include only those things which we con-
ventionally describe as medical bills." 24
Carasso and the dissent in Bilder indicated the need to consult
the legislative history of these sections to discover the intention of
Congress in enacting them.25  The majority in Bilder, on ,the other
hand, urged the use of the so-called "plain meaning doctrine."
This doctrine was expounded in United States v. Harwell,26
wherein the Court stated: "If the language [of the statute] be
clear it is conclusive. There can be no construction where there
is nothing to construe." 27 The doctrine precludes the use of any
outside sources to aid in the interpretation of a statute, if the
statute's meaning is plain on its face.2s
It is to be noted that although the majority in Bilder seem
to adopt the "plain meeting doctrine," the opinion points out
its general decline in American jurisprudence. Even though some
cases still apply this doctrine,29 the majority of Supreme Court
and Court of Appeals decisions have indicated that it should
be discarded. 30  These cases urge that the courts consider all
21 Carasso v. Commissioner, 292 F.2d 367, 368 (2d Cir. 1961); Commis-
sioner v. Bilder, 289 F.2d 291, 307 (3d Cir. 1961) (dissenting opinion).22 See note 13 supra.
23 See note 13 mspra.
24 Commissioner v. Bilder, supra note 21, at 308.
25 Carasso v. Commissioner, supra note 21, at 369; Commissioner v. Bilder,
supra note 21, at 306.
2673 U.S. 385 (1867).
,P1 Id. at 396.
28 United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77 (1932).
29MacDonald v. Best, 186 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Cal. 1960); Fisher Flouring
Mills Co. v. United States, 270 F.2d 27 (9th Cir. 1959).6 g.g., Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse
Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955); Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476
(1943); United States v. N. E. Rosenblum Truck Lines, Inc., 315 U.S. 50
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sources that might aid them in discovering the true interpretation
that should be given to a statute. In Johnson v. United Stat ps,
3
'
Justice Holmes said with regard to the consulting of legislative
history in interpreting a statute:
A statute may indicate or require as its justification a change in the policy
of the law, although it expresses that change only in the specific cases
most likely to occur to the mind. The Legislature has the power to
decide what the policy of the law shall be, and if it has intimated its
will, however indirectly, that will should be recognized and obeyed. The
major premise of the conclusion expressed in a statute, the change of
policy that induces the enactment, may not be set out in terms, but
it is not an adequate discharge of duty for the courts to say: We see
what you are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall
go on as before.
3 2
The Supreme Court in Harrison v. Northern Trust Co."3 recognized
that no rule of law could exist which would prohibit a judge from
resorting to legislative history in attempting to interpret a statute.
United States v. N. E. Rosenblum Truck Lines Inc.34 clearly in-
dicates the Court's modern attitude toward the "plain meaning
doctrine":
Where the plain meaning of words used in a statute produces an unreasonable
result, "plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole,"
we may follow the purpose of the statute rather than the literal words.35
The Supreme Court, in this last case, was permissive in its use
of legislative history, but in Ozawa v,. United States36 and
Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp. 37 the
Court said it was their duty to give effect to the legislative intent
in enacting the statute.' 8 Whether a court imposes a duty or
not, is irrelevant, as long as it recognizes the need for considering
(1942); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922); Cabell v. Markham,
148 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 326 U.S. 404 (1945); Johnson v. United
States, 163 Fed. 30 (1st Cir. 1908).
"1163 Fed. 30 (1st Cir. 1908).
2 Id. at 32.
"3 317 U.S. 476 (1943).
34315 U.S. 50 (1942).
35 Id. at 55. See also Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 95 (1959)
(dissenting opinion), where Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote: "The Court's
task is to construe not English but congressional English. Our problem is
not what do ordinary English words mean, but what did Congress mean them
to mean. 'It is said that when the meaning of language is plain we are
not to resort to evidence in order to raise doubts. That is rather an axiom
of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of
persuasive evidence if it exists.'"
36260 U.S. 178 (1922).
37305 U.S. 315 (1938).
38Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315
(1938); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922).
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sources outside of the statute itself in reaching its interpretation
of a statute.39 The Court in Carasso used the legislative history of
1954 Code sections 262 and 213 as a support for their interpretation
of the sections. The Bilder Court chose to ignore the legislative
intent for the sections and applied the "plain meaning doctrine."
In the light of the House and Senate reports and the Tax
Regulations, the Second Circuit's decision in Carasso seems to
have been the proper interpretation of 1954 Code sections 262 and
213. Bilder in its construction of 1954 Code section 213, con-
cluded that the specific enumeration of "transportation costs" was
merely a specific deduction. This is not plausible because the
1939 Code section 23(x) (the predecessor of 1954 Code section
213) had been interpreted as including these "transportation costs"
and this section is repeated fully in the 1954 section. There
would be no purpose in the legislature's inserting a specific enumera-
tion in a statute if the same subject matter were covered in the
immediately preceding subdivision of the same section. If for
no other reason than this, the Court should have realized that they
erred in their interpretation of the 1954 section. In an attempt to
strengthen their construction of the 1954 Code section the Court in
Bilder used the "plain meaning doctrine." But the Court went
on, in the text of their opinion, and also in footnotes to their
opinion to cite decisions of the United States Supreme Court
and Courts of Appeals which clearly establish the doctrine as a
creature of the past having little significance in modern jur-
isprudence. These flaws in the Bilder opinion have caused a
decision which probably will not be followed in the Tax Court or
any of the other circuits, and if allowed to stand will cause an
inequitable tax advantage to taxpayers in the Third Circuit.
39See Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 326 U.S.404 (1945), wherein Judge Learned Hand remarked: "Of course it is true
that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the primary, and or-
dinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of any writing:
be it a statute, a contract, or anything else. But it is one of the surest
indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out
of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose
or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is
the surest guide to their meaning."
But see United States v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, CCH 1961 STAND.
FED. TAx REP. (61-2 U.S. Tax Cas.)f 9701, at 81820-21 (N.D.N.Y. Oct.
6, 1961), wherein Judge Foley, interpreting a provision of the Internal
Revenue Code, said: "The legislative history gives me little concern. In myjudgment, the statute seems too plain to go beyond. . . . The statement
that the section . . . continues in effect the provisions of existing law . . .
is meager legislative history to contradict simple English language. ...
If such statements raised doubt, and they do not for me, my comfort in
interpretation remains in reading the Statute."
1961]
